I: Introduction
In the second paragraph of "Domesticated and Then Some," Professor Duran characterizes her topic as "the question of the moral significance, from the standpoint of animal rights, of whether or not a species is domesticated." Her question, so stated, is crucially ambiguous. Is it Ql) What can be said about the moral significance of an individual animal in virtue of its being a member of a domesticated species or breed ralher than a wild species or subspecies?1 Or is it 02) What moral significance do domesticated species or breeds have in virtue of their being domesticated rather than wild? Duran's reference to "the standpoint of animal rights" in her topic sentence suggests that she is concerned with the former question, since, as she later admits, the animal rights literature is singularly individualistic. 2 On the other hand, Duran asserts that she and Tom Regan (the foremost animal rights theorist, and an adamantly individualistic one)
...are not, presumably, addressing the same issue. I may wholeheartedly agree that the treatment of the Rhode Island Reds used for egg-laying and meat consumption purposes is inhwnane, and I may even become a vegetarian.
But this is not the same thing as evincing a concern for the preservation of the Rhode Island Red as a breed, in comparison, say, to the Leghorn... This apparent attempt to distance herself from the individualistic stance of the animal rights movement suggests that she intends to address question Q2 rather thanQl'
These two questions presumably are related, since showing that a wild species like the turkey vulture is more morally significant than a domesticated breed of turkey presumably would give us a reason to prefer killing an individual turkey in deference to a turkey vulture, if it came to that. However, the two questions are importantly distinct conceptually, and an argument which supports a certain answer to one may not simul taneously support an analogous answer to the other.
Duran argues by comparing domesticated and wild animals in various ways and concludes that domesticated animals "compare favorably" with wild animals, meaning that, based on the comparisons she considers, domesticated animals are as or more morally significant than their wild cousins. In what follows, I consider each of her comparisons, clarifying the relevance of each comparison to questions Ql and Q2. Notice, however, that Duran never claims that a breed's or a species' being subject to genetic evolution is of any moral significance. And without an argument for that conclusion, it is difficult to see why it should be (especially if, like Duran, we have explicitly rejected as morally irrelevant the fact that domesticated breeds are ill-equipped for survival without human help).4 If the comparison is not of any significance, however, then it provides no reason for thinking that domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species. So at this point in her paper, Duran has given us no reason for thinking that domesticated breeds are even on a par, morally, with wild species, and she has given us only one reason for thinking that domesticated individuals are more morally significant than wild individuals.
Fourth comparison.
After discussing the relevance of Rachels' moral individualism to our treatment of exceptional individuals, Duran introduces another comparison which, she believes, favors domesticated animals: she claims that many or most of them are "exceptional" or "gifted" members of their species. Here again, Duran does not explicitly claim that this comparison is morally relevant. She writes that "domesticated animals are not typical of their species, and if this.. .is relevant to their moral standing... [then] it probably speaks in their favor..... (emphasis altered). But let us grant that the comparison is significant. Clearly, the phrase "typical of their species" cannot be interpreted as referring to species, and the sense of the phrase is strained by interpreting it as referring to breeds. The sense pretty clearly is this: "the individual domesticated animals that make up a breed are not typical members of their species." Only individuals can be atypical representatives of their species. So even if we suppose that Duran has now given us a second reason for thinking that domesticated individuals are more morally significant than wild individuals, she still has not provided us with any reason for thinking that domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species.
Fifth comparison. Duran next discusses the significance of the fact that domesticated breeds have acquired the special traits they have because human breeders valued those traits. At first glance this seems to be a comparison of domesticated and wild , individuals, since it is at the level of individuals that genetic "traits" are expressed. Earlier in the paper, One might be inclined to note that the traits which these animals have are, ofcourse, traits specifically desired by humans, but...one could move with that assertion in either direction.
Between the Species
Here Duran seems uncertain whether or not to be embarrassed by appearing to base concern for domesticated animals on anthropocentric reasoning, for the passage continues:
Surely the fact that a German short-haired pointer puppy may begin spontaneously to point at an early age does not count against the value of pointers as such, since pointing is merely an exaggeration of traits which most dogs possess. This reference to "the value of pointers as such" suggests that Duran wants, if at all possible, to find inherent value in domesticated animals, rather than relying on their instrumental value to humans. The next sentence of the paragraph similarly suggests that she would be unwilling to place much weight on her fifth comparison even if it were admitted as morally relevant Sixth comparison. Here Concerning question Ql> she has offered three reasons for thinking that individual domesticated animals are more morally significant than individual wild animals. Specifically, she has argued that A) they often are more acutely sensitive to pain and/or to emotional distress (comparison #2), B) they often are "exceptional" or "gifted" members of their species (comparison #4), and C) they often are valued by human beings for historical and cultural reasons (comparison #5). Although she appears to admit that (C), if morally relevant, is outweighed by the fact that individual members of wild species are "members of the original primeval environment," reasons (A) and (B) do, if accepted, support her contention that, on the whole, domesticated individuals are more morally significant than wild individuals. This is how Duran's argument supports answer Al to question QI.
Concerning question Q2, Duran has offered only one comparison in support of answer A 2 , namely that domesticated breeds are more morally significant than wild species insofar as the former are of greater historical and cultural value than the latter. However, as I indicated earlier, Duran is herself skeptical of the relevance of this comparison, and she appears to think that it is outweighed by the fact that wild species are "members of the original primeval environment" So, rather than supporting answer A 2 to question Q2, Duran's analysis actually supports answer A 2 1:
A 2 1) Wild species or subspecies have greater moral significance than domesticated species or breeds. Duran's concluding paragraph is, therefore, misleadingly written. She writes:
In sum, I have argued that if we can accept a view of animal rights for non-domesticated species, there are probably no strong reasons for denying the rights to domesticated species, both when seen from the standpoint of the individual creatures involved, and when seen from the (more interesting. I believe) stand point of breeds vs. species.
Duran fails clearly to distinguish question QI from question Q2. and she therefore speaks as if. in arguing for a particular answer to the fIrSt question. she has simultaneously argued for an analogous answer to the second.
Notes
1 Hereafter I speak simply of wild "species" instead of "species or subspecies," and of domesticated "breeds" rather than "species or breeds." Also, in what follows I speak consistently of the relative "moral significance" of various entities. Duran speaks interchangeably of "moral significance" and "moral rights," but the two concepts are distinct from each other. and each is in tum distinct from the concept of bare moral considerability. On this point, .see Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," JollT1llJ1oj"Philosophy75 (1978) ,pp. 311-12. To Goodpaster's analysis I would add only that, assuming that moral rights function to protect interests, having interests is a necessary condition for having rights, but not necessarily for being morally considerable. It may be that an object's being beautiful suffices to make it morally considerable. This, apparently, was G. E. Moore's view in Principia Ethica. For an application to endangered species (both wild and domesticated) see Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species Matter?" Environmental Ethics3 (1981) , pp. 101-12. Notice, however that Russow's argument does not show that endangered species and breeds themselves have aesthetic value, since, as she is careful to note, only the individual members of an endangered breed or species instantiate beauty. wild, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for saying that it is domesticated. Probably the fact that a population would either perish or \Dldergo radical change if human interaction with it were withdrawn is sufficient for saying that it is no longer wild. A species like the California condor is no longer wild, precisely because this is true of it. However, the California condor is not therefore domesticated. So the fact that a population would either perish or undergo radical change if human interaction with it were withdrawn is not sufficient for saying that it is domesticated. Neither is it necessary, however. For surely there are or have been some domesticated breeds (e.g., prospectors' burros) which would neither perish nor change radically upon reverting to a feral condition. 
